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Editor's Note
This article was originally delivered as an address to the Institute of
Correctional Law Conference on Due Process in the Prison, held at the
Villanova University School of Law on January 30 and 31, 1976. The
address was delivered extemporaneously from an outline, and the wording
is derived from the transcript of the conference, which is on file at the
Institute of Correctional Law, Villanova University School of Law,
Villanova, Pennsylvania. The transcript of the address was edited to
eliminate some of its oral quality and to provide substantive clarification
in some parts. Supporting footnotes were supplied where appropriate.

The Editors

I WOULD LIKE TO TRACE THE WAY in which the due process
clause has evolved. We forget that due process is a very flexible
and very expansive concept. The most forceful way I can think of to
remind you how flexible and how expansive it is, is to give you an
admittedly superficial history of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. I hope the value of this background will be to suggest
the directions in which due process must go, if the courts are going
to be able to cope with the problems of due process in the prisons.
There will be many different points of view with respect to which
is the proper direction, but I suggest that we can make a better judgment in choosing among those points of view if we bear in mind the
history of the clause. I will suggest, at the end of my remarks, my
own opinion as to the course of the due process doctrine in the future.
I have no idea what the reaction will be to my own feeling about how
due process might develop, but I hope to provoke discussion, because
judges, attorneys, and corrections officials are the people who are
giving daily meaning to due process.
t Judge, Superior Court of Pennsylvania; Chairman, Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Recodification of the Criminal Code; President, Philadelphia
Commission for Effective Criminal Justice. A.B., Harvard University, 1942; LL.B.,
Harvard University, 1948.
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The place to start is with the language of the fourteenth amendment, which states: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."' The first thing to
notice about this language is that it limits action - deprivation - by
a state. But in fact, it is exactly the same language as is contained in the
fifth amendment, which provides, with respect to the federal government: "nor shall any person ...

be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law." 2 From the outset of our constitutional history, the fifth amendment's requirement of due process was regarded as
requiring due process only in the enforcement of the law; it was not
thought to pertain at all to the content of the law.' Consequently, when
the first cases came up after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court took the same very limited view of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause as it had in interpreting that

clause in the fifth amendment.
The great decision was the Slaughter-House Cases.4 A Louisiana
statute provided that a given corporation had the exclusive right to
butcher cattle in New Orleans. 5 An action was brought by the other
butchers, who asserted that the statute was contrary to the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, because it deprived the butchers of
their property.6 It put them out of business. The Supreme Court rejected that argument very summarily, simply stating: "Under no construction of the due process clause that we have ever seen . .. can the
restraint imposed by the state of Louisiana upon the exercise of their
trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held to be a deprivation of
property within the meaning of that provision."'
Just a few years later, in Munn v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court
again refused to invalidate a statute which was alleged to be a denial
of due process.' There, the statute regulated the rate that could be
charged for the warehousing of grain.'" Chief Justice Waite wrote
for the Court: "We know that this is a power [of rate regulation]
1. U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 1.

2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1856). See generally Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law
Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1911).
4. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
5. Id. at 59.
6. Id. at 60.
7. Id. at 81.
8. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
9. Id. at 134.
10. Id. at 123.
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which may be abused, but that is no argument against its existence.
For protection against abuses by Legislatures, the people must resort
to the polls, not to the courts.""
Those words were written in 1877. Within about twenty years,
the Court entirely reversed itself and transformed the due process
clause into one of the most effective weapons against the legislature.
The philosophy that so led the Court had been stated by Justice
Bradley in the dissent in the Slaughter-HouseCases.'2 He argued that
the butchers, like any other citizens, had a fundamental right - he
used the word "fundamental," but he was really talking about "natural rights" 3 - to choose their calling.4 ' He declared: "[A] law
which prohibits a large class of citizens from adopting a lawful employment ...

does deprive them of liberty, as well as property, without

due process of law."' 5
What happened in that period of the late 1800's and early 1900's
was that the state legislatures were responding to the dislocations created by the industrial revolution, and they enacted all kinds of remedial
legislation.' 6 Justice Bradley's theory of natural rights was repeatedly
argued to the Supreme Court by those who objected to having their
1
businesses regulated in this mannerY.
So within about twenty years,
the courts heeded those appeals, and completely reversed the philosophy
they had taken regarding the content of due process." The Justices made
this change in a very interesting way. First, the Court held that the
police power of the state was restricted to promoting public health,
morals, and safety.' 9 Second, the Court changed the burden of proof.
It used to be that a statute was presumptively valid. 2' Gradually, the
Court shifted the burden, so that where the statute affected what the
Court considered to be a natural or fundamental right of a person the liberty to make a contract,2 ' the right to hold property 2 - the
burden fell on the state to show that the statute was authorized by the
11. Id. at 134.
12. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 111 (Bradley, J., dissenting).

13. Id. at 114; see B. Twiss,

LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION

105 (1942).

14. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 120.

15. Id. at 122.
16.
(9th ed.
17.
18.

See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 553-54
1975).
See, e.g., Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.

623 (1887).
19. See New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 672 (1885).
20. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887), citing The Sinking Fund
Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718 (1878).
21. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
22. See Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 392-93 (1898).
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Constitution, not merely that it was not forbidden by the Constitution.23
Finally, in deciding whether the state had met that burden, the
Court did not hesitate to look outside of the record and take judicial
notice of facts that would persuade it as to whether the statute was
proper. The great case that illustrated this method was Lochner v.
New York, 24 decided in 1905. There, the Court held invalid a statute
that restricted employment in bakeries to ten hours a day and sixty
hours a week. 25 The Court announced that the statute was an unconstitutional interference with the right of adults to enter into contracts
with respect to their livelihood.2" The state submitted considerable
medical evidence in support of the statute, but the Court, unmoved,
replied with this language: "To the common understanding the trade
of a baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy one .... It might
be safely affirmed that almost all occupations more or less affect the
health . . .But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative

majorities ?-128
The Court had completely changed its position. Thirty years later,
it completely changed its position again. In 1937, in the case of West
29
Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,
the Court upheld minimum wage
°
legislation
and initiated a process of overruling a whole series of
cases, Lochner" among them. As we all know, the Great Depression
had struck, and the rights to liberty and property were no longer
regarded as absolutes. Instead, it was acknowledged that the liberty
of one person might be used in such a way as to coerce another person,
and it was recognized that the legislature had the right to intervene
to mitigate the effect of such coercion.32 This shift of position represented a great triumph for Justice Holmes, who filed a series of classic
dissents, beginning with Lochner.3 3 In one of them, he commented that
it was a legitimate objective of the legislature to try to establish the
equality of position between the parties in which the liberty to contract
operates ;4 and in Lochner, he pointed out that the majority's definition
of liberty depended upon accepting a given economic theory which was
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 52.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 59.
Id.

29. 300 U.S. 397 (1937).
30. Id.
31. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. See

E.CORWIN,

LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT

33. 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915)
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not written into or otherwise a part of the Constitution." By the time
the Court finished overruling cases such as Lochner, it had returned
to the statement made by Chief Justice Waite in Munn, that if legislation had somehow interfered with their natural rights, people should
resort to the polls rather than the courts. 6
While all of that change was going on, an entirely different conception of due process developed and expanded. The due process concept found in cases such as Lochner is frequently referred to as substantive due process.3 7 As the Court moved away from substantive
due process, its attention returned to procedural due process, which is
where due process originated. 8 The question underlying procedural
due process, and the question with which corrections officials are daily
concerned, is what procedures must be followed in enforcing a given
law? The basic approach taken by the Court in answering that question is that the requirements of procedural due process will vary according to the particular case.39 Procedures adequate to determine a welfare
claim, for example, may not be adequate in trying a felony case.40 But
as the cases have developed, certain basic requirements niay be discerned. There must be notice, and that notice must be sufficient to
inform the interested parties of the pendency of the proceeding, and to
enable them to prepare for it.4 There must be a hearing before an
impartial tribunal, 42 and during the hearing, it must be possible to
confront and cross-examine witnesses.43 There must be a reasoned
44
decision of record.
On the civil side, procedural due process has developed an extraordinary reach. It touches everything from deportation,4 5 to replevin

35. 198 U.S. at 75 (dissenting opinion).
36. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877).
37. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 548-656.
38. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1856) (upholding the constitutionality of a distress warrant procedure);
G. GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 507.
39. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
40. Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare claims), with
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial of felony case).
41. Covey v. Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank
& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
42. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U.S.
133 (1955).
43. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474,
496-97 (1959).
44. Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. PUC, 260 U.S. 48, 57-59 (1922).
45. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration,
273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927).
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of personal property,4 6 garnishment of wages,47 confession of judgment,48 termination of welfare benefits,49 claims for social security," °
and other areas.
Even more dramatic has been its development on the criminal
side. It used to be that there was a marked difference between procedural due process in a state court and in a federal court. In a federal
court, the contents of procedural due process were largely defined and are largely defined - by the Bill of Rights, particularly the first
eight amendments." This proposition did not hold true in the state
courts. The state courts were bound only by the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, and for many years, the Court required only
fundamentally fair procedures. 2 Justice Cardozo's test was whether
the procedural right involved was "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."5 " Today, there is very little difference between federal and
state procedure. I believe there is still room for some difference, but I
am uncertain as to the extent.
Justice Black was the great leader in bringing state procedure into
parity with federal procedure, and as a result of his persuasion,5 4 most

of the procedural requirements of the Bill of Rights have been absorbed
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment: the fourth
amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures ;55
the fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy 6 and the right
not to incriminate oneself;" the sixth amendment right to a speedy,
46.
47.
(1975);
48.
49.

See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem., Inc., 419 U.S. 601
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
See, e.g., Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

50. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
51. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968); Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78, 99 (1908).
52. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963)

(Harlan, J., concurring).

53. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
54. For a sampling of Justice Black's reasoning, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (concurring opinion) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961)
(concurring opinion); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 139 (1954) (dissenting
opinion) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (concurring opinion) ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
55. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
56. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
57. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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public, jury trial,5" the right to notice of charges, confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel;" and the eighth amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment."0 All of those protections,
formerly applicable only as part of due process in the federal courts, are
now applicable as part of due process under the fourteenth amendment
in the state courts. The result has been to transform criminal trials.
Here is a colorful example. If federal agents seized evidence without a proper warrant, they could not use it in a federal trial. The local
police, however, were not bothered with any "vexatious unreasonable
search and seizure requirements;" if they seized the evidence without
a proper warrant, they could use it themselves, in a state trial, or they
could walk down the street and give it to the federal agents, who could
then use it in the federal trial, on the reasoning that not they, but the
local police had seized it. The name of the doctrine allowing this
practice was the "silver platter" doctrine,6" for obvious reasons. Now
the local police are just as bound to get a search warrant as the federal
agents.6 2
There are many other elements of procedural due process that
have been developed since the Court has struggled with these concepts.
I will mention only a few of them. A statute will be held to deny due
process if it is too vague to give the defendants notice of what they are
supposed to have done wrong.63 A statutory presumption, either expressed or implied, may be struck down as a denial of due process.6 4
In this connection, the great case is the one involving Timothy Leary. 5
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial) ; Klopfer v.
North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to a speedy trial) ; Turner v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 466 (1965) (right to impartial jury); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)
(right to a public trial).
59. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (counsel) ; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894) (notice of charges).
60. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958);
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
61. The "silver platter" doctrine was explained by Justice Frankfurter, in Lustig
v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949), as follows: "The crux of that doctrine is that a
search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a
federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal
authorities on a silver platter." Id. at 78-79 (emphasis added).
62. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
63. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) ; Jordan
v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). See generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
64. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (presumption implied by the application of public school maternity leave regulation) ; Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932) (presumption expressly written into federal tax statute).
65. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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Under the particular statute, if he possessed marijuana, he was presumed to know that it was illegally imported."6 The Court found such
a presumption to be arbitrary and a denial of due process."7 A violation
of due process will be found if the prosecutor suppresses evidence favorable to the defendant. 8 A court will not be permitted to accept a guilty
plea unless it is sure that the defendant is entering the plea voluntarily
and intelligently, and it cannot be sure until it satisfies itself that the
defendant knows a great deal about the right to a jury trial, the conduct
of a jury trial, the charge, the elements of the offense, and the sentences
that may be imposed.69 A defendant's right to counsel includes the
right to appellate counsel."' If the defendant is put on probation or is
released on parole, the probation or parole cannot be revoked without
quite an elaborate procedure.7 This last example is particularly interesting and important. It used to be said that one had to bear in mind
whether a right or a privilege was involved, 72 and parole and probation
were regarded as privileges. 73 Probation was considered a gift or "act
of grace'74 by the government to the prisoner. When dealing with
privileges, the defendant was not entitled to due process, and the defendant was only entitled to due process when there was an interference
with rights.75 Such distinctions are not drawn today.76 In 1963, then
Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger wrote an opinion in which he indicated that the prisoner had little need for due process before a parole
board, because a parole board was not to be regarded as an adversary
of the prisoner; it had the prisoner's interests at heart; its concern was
rehabilitation. 7 Later, Chief Justice Burger wrote these words in
66. Id. at 30.
67. Id. at 36, 53.
68. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
69. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
70. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
71. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation); Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole).
72. See Numer v. Miller, 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948); Van Alstyne, The
Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HA.v. L. REv.

1439 (1968).
73. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935)

(probation); Ughbanks v. Armstrong,

208 U.S. 481 (1908) (parole).
74. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935) (Cardozo, J.).
75. See Van Alstyne, supra note 72, at 1440.

76. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) ; Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) ; Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 72,

at 1458-64.
77. -yser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).

The procedural protections due a parole applicant are roughly equivalent to

those afforded the convict at the sentencing proceeding. Menechino v. Oswald, 420
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971).
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Morrissey v. Brewer:78 "By whatever name the [probationer's or
parolee's liberty is called], the liberty is valuable and must be seen as
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. Its termination
calls for some orderly process, however informal." '7 9
I offer this very summary history, because, as you look back and
consider how changeable and how expansive the definition of due
process has been, you can sense how the courts are almost inevitably
propelled into the prison. As recently as thirty years ago, the prevailing doctrine was that prisoners forfeited all of their liberties," ° as shown
by that old case out of Virginia which described the prisoner as a
"slave of the state.""' Fortunately, this idea is no longer with us. 82
In 1948 the Supreme Court said that a prisoner only lost so many
rights and privileges as justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system," More recently, a court has noted that a convict is a
person entitled to the protection of the fourteenth amendment.8 4 Given
this framework, the courts had to wonder what protections were afforded by the fourteenth amendment and what considerations were
underlying our penal system, and as they wondered, they have become
increasingly anxious. On the one hand, the Court has observed: "Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons .... We are not unmindful that
prison officials must be accorded latitude in the administration of prison
affairs." 85 On the other hand, the same Court indicated in the same
paragraph, that it does sit "to enforce the constitutional rights of all
'persons,' including prisoners. '"86
87
The Supreme Court's most recent decision, Wolff v. McDonnell,
reflects this tension between protecting without supervising. 8 I do
not see any easy resolution of the tension. In fact, I see the tension
increasing to the point where the courts will have to devise a third
form of due process, applying not simply to a given individual whose
liberty may be threatened, but encompassing the entire criminal justice
system. The fundamental hope underlying procedural due process is
78. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
79. Id. at 482.
80. See S. KRANTZ, THE

LAW OF CORRECTIONS AND

PRISONERS'

RIGHTS

227

(1973).
81. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
82. See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 225 U.S.

887 (1945).
83. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
84. Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd mer.,
390 U.S. 333 (1968).
85. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).

86. Id. at 321.
87. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

88. See id. at 556.
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that, by insisting upon sound procedure, the enforcement of the law may
be made fair. Perhaps the most famous due process case is Gideon v.
Wainwright,9 which held that the accused must have counsel. Why
does he need counsel? Because a trial cannot otherwise be fair; the
accused does not know enough to protect himself: he cannot decide
what evidence is admissible, and he cannot really understand the indictment. Criminal defendants need lawyers to guide them." If that
fundamental hope is to be realized, I suggest that procedural due process
must go a great deal farther than it has so far, because there are many
highly arbitrary, unregulated aspects of the administration of criminal
justice today. These aspects must be brought within the ambit of procedural due process if we are to have any expectations of a fair administration of the criminal law. For instance, in Pennsylvania the choice
of which cases to prosecute, and which cases to divert away from
prosecution and into what is known as Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) 9 ' is almost entirely arbitrary at present. The amount
of bail9 2 fixed, or the decision to grant bail at all, is almost entirely
arbitrary. Sentencing" is almost entirely arbitrary, in due process
terms. The Supreme Court has started to nibble at the due process
implications of sentencing. The key case is one in which the record
demonstrated that in imposing sentence, the judge had taken into account facts that were not true.94
Even within the prison, due process must be extended. Having
put aside the old privilege/right dichotomy,95 the classification procedures become critically important. 6 Does a prisoner have a right to
health care as a matter of due process? The Court will find itself
backed into that consideration, because it has already held in O'Connor
v. Donaldson 7 that a state cannot confine a civilly committed person,
without treatment, if that person is nondangerous and could live in
normal society either alone or with aid from family or friends.' The
Donaldson holding is very narrow, 99 but these narrow holdings have a
89. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
90. Id. at 345.
91. PA. R. CRIM. P. 175-85.
92. PA. R. CRIM. P. 4003-04.

93. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1401-09.

94. Townsend v. Burke, .334 U.S. 736 (1948).
95. For a brief discussion of the right/privilege dichotomy, see notes 72-76 and
accompanying text supra.
96. Federal courts have already been called upon to review state classification
procedures. See, e.g., Morris V. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970).
97. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
98. Id. at 576. Although the Court remanded to the court of appeals the question of the hospital superintendent's personal liability, the Court's holding impliedly
acknowledged that such personal liability was possible. Id. at 576-77.
99. See id. at 573.
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way of expanding. I think it will expand from the civil field into the
criminal field. An action is now pending in Philadelphia, asserting
that prisoners who need mental health care in the Philadelphia County
prisons are entitled, as a matter of law, to have it.'
The action was
brought under the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act,''
but the constitutional overtones are very apparent.
What about prisoners' right to work? Do they have a right to
be paid for work? Is running the prison with prison labor, especially
if the prisoner is a detentioner and thus presumed innocent, in conformity with due process? Whatever the answers to those questions,
the traditional hope of the law is that procedural due process will work
out answers, and when the answers are worked out, the result will be
fairly administered prisons. My closing point is this proposition: I
do not think we will find the answers; I do not think we can. Because
of my belief in that respect, I think that due process is going to move
in a direction that it never has moved before.
The prisons now are in for very hard days. On the one hand,
more and more people are going to enter the prisons. The sentences
are not going to get shorter; they will get longer. A number of
legislatures are choosing to enact mandatory sentencing statutes. Meanwhile, prison budgets are not going to be increased sufficiently, if at all.
New York City is broke. Philadelphia is in trouble. All the big cities
are in the same position. Furthermore, few people care. There will not
be the push to make prisons the sort of institutions where the procedural
due process that has already evolved, or will evolve, can work. If these
predictions are correct, there will be a very painful confrontation. It
has already happened in New York City. What does a court do when,
under the principles of due process, it concludes that a prison does not
100. Green v. Soffer, No. 3381 (C.P. Phila., filed March 28, 1973).
101. See Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (1969). Certain definitional sections of the Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act have recently been repealed by the Mental Health Procedures
Act of 1976 (the 1976 Act), Act No. 143, §§ 101-503, 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 345-61
(to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, §§ 7101-7503).
Section 102 of the 1976 Act states in pertinent part: "It is the policy of the
Commonwealth . . . to seek to assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons

who are mentally ill .

. . ."

Act No. 143, § 102, 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 346 (to be

codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7102). Section 401 (a) of the 1976 Act provides
that if a prisoner "is or becomes severely mentally disabled, proceedings may be instituted for examination and treatment under the civil provisions of this act in the
same manner" as if he were not a prisoner. Act No. 143, § 401, 1976 Pa. Legis. Serv.
357 (to be codified as PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7401). Perhaps the policy of the Act

and its nondiscriminatory application to prisoners can be construed as creating a
prisoner's right to adequate treatment, at least as to those prisoners who are "severely
mentally disabled."
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give due process, and the prison officials answer in effect: "We are
doing the best we can?" Either the court backs down, or the court
closes the prison. A federal district court judge in New York took
the latter course, saying generally: "If you do not make the Tombs
in conformity with principles of constitutional law, I will close it,"
0
and he closed it.'

2

I suggest that closing the prisons is not a solution, and that something else must be worked out. I think the alternative is to develop a
far more expansive view of due process. Reflecting upon the history of
due process and the extraordinary changes that it has already undergone, I do not hesitate to make such a suggestion. This new due process
will have to view the administration of criminal justice in systemic,
rather than in individual, terms. The only case that I know of which
has expressly taken this approach is a case out of Philadelphia, where
the court pointed out that the Philadelphia prison violated the constitutional rights of the prisoners in a variety of respects. °3 But then it
further pointed out that relief could not be expected solely by reforming
the prison. 1' Recently, there was a conference of prison superintendents and others concerned with prisons, from seventeen southern
states. 0 5 These people asserted that there is no sense of coordination
or planning in the criminal justice system; that the police, the prosecutors, and the courts all acted without any consideration of the impact
that their unrelated and disjointed decisions might have upon the
prisons. 01 0 The inevitable result is that prisons are hopelessly unable
to conform to the legal requirements that evolving principles of procedural due process are imposing upon them.
The Philadelphia Commission for Effective Criminal Justice has
made a survey of the Philadelphia criminal justice system, with this
102. Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d
Cir. 1974). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's finding
that the prison, as operated, violated the Constitution, but remanded for a reconsideration of the remedy. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974). On remand, the
district court entered judgment and held that the prisoners, who had since been transferred to another prison, had the same constitutional rights regardless of where they
were confined. Rhem v. Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 527 F.2d
1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
103. Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 2437 (C.P. Phila., filed Apr. 7, 1972). The trial
court also ordered the appointment of a master to aid in preparing a plan to correct
prison conditions. Id. On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed this appointment
Hendrick v. Jackson, 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 392, 309 A.2d 187 (1973). On further
appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's appointment of a
master. Jackson v. Hendrick, 457 Pa. 405, 321 A.2d 603 (1974).
104. Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 2437 (C.P. Phila., filed Apr. 7, 1972).
105. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1976, at 24, col. 1. These corrections officials met under
the auspices of the Southern Governors Conference in Nashville, Tennessee. Id.
106. Id.
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very problem in mind. A handful of the facts that the Commission
found will illustrate the problem: an estimated $261 million is invested
in the criminal justice system in Philadelphia in a year; approximately
$132 million of that amount goes for arresting people; and $78 million
of it goes for trying them; the prisons get $16 million; probation and
parole get $5.7 million. 0 7 The figures themselves suggest a disproportion, but the problem goes deeper than this superficial indication.
These enormous sums of money are allocated without any previous
planning, without any thought as to what impact the conduct of one
component of the system will have on another. There is no evaluation
of the programs or activities undertaken by any of the components.
Some of the results are very striking. From 1972 to 1974, with
enormous backlogs in the courts, a staggering number of gambling
cases were tried, with remarkable results: less than ten percent were
found guilty, and only a handful went to jail.' 0 8 In another instance,
a program was set up to try to relieve the overcrowding in the prisons
by providing for pretrial services and conditional probation. 9 It was
funded to handle 1500 people, but its case load was 185."' No one
has monitored this program. No one has asked: "What went wrong?"
As for diversion, it is said that the criminal justice system would
collapse but for the number of people being diverted out of it. But the
criteria by which the diversion decision is made are not even written,
much less promulgated. What sort of followup is there? No one knows.
In 1972, when that Philadelphia court looked at the prisons, it discovered that forty-five percent of the detentioners were in prison for
only seven days."' In other words, their bail would be set, but they
could not make the bail initially; therefore, they went through the
full-dress criminal process; they were taken by the sheriff to the
prison; they were classified, issued clothing, and assigned a cell; and
then within seven days, they managed to make the bail and were released." 2 The process is utterly disruptive of any orderly administration
107.

PHILADELPHIA

AND COMMENTARY 1

COMMISSION FOR EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FACT SHEET

(1975).

108. See 1972 ANNUAL REP. OF PHILADELPHIA COMMON PLEAS & MUNICIPAL
COURTS 26, 48; 1973 ANNUAL REP.
OF THE PHILADELPHIA COMMON PLEAS &
MUNICIPAL COURTS 21, 43; 1974 ANNUAL REP. OF THE PHILADELPHIA COMMON PLEAS
& MUNICIPAL COURTS 20, 41.
109. INSTITUTE FOR CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
LAW CENTER, SECOND YEAR REPORT, EVALUATION OF CONDITIONAL RELEASE PROGRAM,
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

9 (1975).

110. Id.
111. Jackson v. Hendrick, No. 2437 (C.P. Phila., filed Apr. 7, 1972).
112. Id.; see note 103 supra.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 1 [1976], Art. 1

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 22 : p. 1

of a prison. Since that time, there have been many programs instituted," 3 but the percentage of seven-day detentioners remains fifty-one
percent. 11 4 That indicates a complete lack of control.
Somewhere along the line - and I suggest that it will have to be
in the courts - a judge will be forced to say: "I cannot look at a
given, individual prisoner to see whether he is getting due process.
I know that he is not getting it. The prison in which he is an inmate
is overwhelmed by its physical difficulties. Therefore, the only way
that procedural due process can be achieved is not through an individual
approach, but an approach which considers the individual in an entire
system and makes the system itself follow some minimum degree of
rational planning." I would agree at once that no court has said anything similar. Due process has not gone nearly so far. But we have
seen how it has changed since the late 1800's, and how fast it is changing now. It is not my prediction, but it is my hope that it will go in
the direction that I have outlined for you.
113. See generally

PHILADELPHIA COMMISSION FOR EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE GUIDE

114.

(1975).

PHILADELPHIA COMMISSION FOR EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT

ON INTERVENTIONS TO REDUCE SHORT-TERM DETENTION

2 (1975)

(prepared

by F.

Farrow and T. Gilmore).
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